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Abstract 
Country rankings with respect to a country’s business environment draw strong international 
attention. Methods of business environment assessment differ; two competing methods will 
be described and compared with respect to their results for Rwanda in the years 2008-2010. 
They do not come to the same results regarding regulatory deficits and hence the demand 
for regulatory reform. When regulatory cost is considered, demand and supply of reforms are 
more in line than without cost considerations. The effectiveness of reforms undertaken in 
Rwanda varies. Based on interviews in late 2010, not all reforms were having the expected 
impact “on the ground”.  
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DB   World Bank/IFC Doing Business Project 
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IFC    International Finance Corporation 
IFS    International Financial Statistics 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
 “‘Red Tape’ is a short hand for unnecessary or excessively complicated regulations and 
inefficient administrative processes” (SBP 2008, 9).  
 “The expression ‘red tape’ refers to any unnecessary or redundant regulation that hin-
ders productivity (CFIB 2010, 2). 
Reduction of Red Tape is supposed to reduce business cost and therefore contribute to the 
level and growth GDP. It is a part of Good Governance.1 The degree of Red Tape existing in 
a country’s business environment is measured by a variety of measures and rankings. If pos-
itive, they are used by governments in their internal and external PR strategies.  
The goal of this paper is to assess whether methods for evaluation of business regulatory 
environments paint a true picture of the regulatory regimes and thus contribute to Good Gov-
ernance. The case analyzed here is Rwanda.  
The first chapter briefly outlines the different methods of business environment analysis and 
the empirical evidence on the relevance of business environment reform for growth. The se-
cond chapter explores two competing concepts of business environment assessment in more 
depth: first, the SBP approach which is based on surveys of subjective perceptions of busi-
nesses, and second the World Bank’s Doing Business (DB) Indicators which measure regu-
lations as decreed by authorities. Both approaches will be compared with regard to 
 Goals, 
 Method of gathering information, 
 Types of businesses considered, 
 Regional and sectoral scope, 
 Estimation of regulatory cost, 
 Ability to measure correctly supply of reforms be the government (DB) and demand for 
reforms by businesses (SBP), 
 Effects on the government’s reform agenda. 
The third chapter focuses on the results of both the DB and the SBP approach with regard to 
Rwanda. First, economic reforms as decreed by the Rwandan government will be described. 
This constitutes the supply side of business environment reforms. DB will then be analyzed 
regarding its accuracy of measuring the supply side. The results of the SBP exercise of 2008 
represent the demand side2 for reforms. Demand and supply of reforms will then be com-
                                                
1  The World Bank conceives business environment regulation as one of 16 criteria for good govern-
ance (World Bank 2005, 15). 
2  For demand for institutional change: (Streeck/Thelen 2005, 2). 
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pared in order to establish whether the Rwandan government by its policy met the demands 
of the business sector. Finally, the third chapter will compare the results of a survey of busi-
ness environment conducted in 2010 with the assessment of the business environment by 
DB in the same year. This comparison is then used to evaluate whether the reforms under-
taken in Rwanda between 2008 and 2010 have actually been effective and thus have con-
tributed to the overall goal of Good Governance.  
1.2 Measures of business environment quality 
The analysis of a country’s business environment as performed by the World Bank’s Doing 
Business (DB) Project has gained both increasing public and private attention. Latest results 
of this annual exercise have been widely published and commented (e.g. Economist 2010, 
71-73); governments see the results as a measure of their reform efforts or use it as vehicle 
to initiate such reforms. Firms and investors in particular see it as a measure of the ease of 
doing business in a country. As a matter of fact, the DB’s overall ranking of countries is 
called the “Ease of Doing Business Indicator”.  
Ever since its inception, the DB project has been receiving critical reviews. The World Bank 
Doing Business Webpage3 provides for a section listing major analytical work based on the 
DB methodology. On top of that, Google Scholar lists over 1.5 million entries that relate to 
the DB project.  
The methodology underlying DB is not undisputed and has led to internal evaluation of the 
project (IEG 2008). Also, DB is not the only approach to measuring business environment. 
The World Bank undertakes two more projects (Investment Climate Index and Business En-
terprise Surveys); outside the World Bank there are assessments provided by the World 
Economic Forum (Global Competitiveness Report), the UNCTAD (World Investment Report) 
and private sources like the Economist Intelligence Unit, to name a few.4,5 
These approaches complement the DB project; however, in 2008 an alternative to DB was 
initiated for Rwanda by the country’s Private Sector Federation (PSF), the major Rwandan 
association of private firms.6 The resulting report “Cutting the cost of Red Tape” (short: Red 
                                                
3  See http://www.doingbusiness.org/. 
4  Comparative analyses of measures of business environment are numerous. Most of them focus on 
the different methods of calculating the cost of regulation to businesses. Also, most of them start 
from the factual regulation as determined by government decrees. Few, however, include in their 
analysis the subjective perception of business regulation within a wider framework of general mar-
ket conditions. An exception is (FIAS 2009). 
5  For a comparison of the World Bank’s Doing Business approach and the Business Enterprise Sur-
vey approach see http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology/Compare.aspx. 
6  This report is one of the results of the project “Promotion of the economy and employment” com-
missioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and 
co-funded by the Royal Netherlands Embassy to Rwanda; the project duration is from 2004 to 
2013. GTZ on behalf of BMZ implements this project, which, apart from the so-called Red Tape 
analysis consists of further instruments (e.g. business and investment climate surveys, Regulatory 
Impact Assessment) to strengthen the private sector and improve the business environment in 
Rwanda. 
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Tape Report, RTR) analyses areas of business environment similar to those of DB, but em-
ploys a different methodological approach (SBP 2008). In view of the remarkable improve-
ment of Rwanda’s position in the DB rankings after publication of this report, the question 
arises whether the reforms are attributable to DB, RTR, or both. The underlying methodolo-
gies and their results will be compared.  
Generally speaking, the RTR method of information gathering is perception-based, relying on 
a large number of respondents, whereas the DB method is mainly fact based, relying on a 
comparatively small number of respondents.  
 RTR allows for the determination of regulatory cost by sector, firm size and region, 
whereas DB assumes a standard business case. 
 RTR is part of a comprehensive Public Private Dialogue, whereas DB is selectively in-
cluding administration representatives.  
The differences in quality and quantity of results of the competing approaches will be ana-
lyzed in this paper. 
 
Table 1: Assessing the business environment7 
1.3 The regulation – Growth connex 
In order to assess the relevance of business environment studies, the role of the business 
environment for growth and investment has to be analyzed. For both, RTR and DB, the term 
“business environment” is defined as the set of regulations governing private sector activity. 
The rationale behind business environment analysis is that less cumbersome regulation will 
enhance growth of firms and employment (IEG 2008, 3). In other words, regulation, directly, 
though not solely, affects investment climate and investment activity and therefore growth9 
(Figure 1). While most analyzes find a positive correlation between the quality of regulation 
and growth, the direction of causality is not clear. Also, it is not quite clear whether business 
regulation as measured by the DB indicators is strongly correlated with both factual regula-
tion as it affects businesses and economic outcomes (Commander/Svejnar 2007).  
                                                
7  For a more detailed description of the types of analysis see (SBP 2008, 15). 
8  Ex ante evaluation / RIA is part of the GTZ project, but not subject of discussion here. 
9  A fundamental paper on the issue is: (Djankov et al 2000); (Djankov et al 2006); for an analysis 
based on firm data in Bangladesh, India, China and Pakistan see: (Dollar et al 2003, 29); for a 
larger set of industrialized and developing countries, see (Ciccone 2007, 17); for OECD countries 
see (Alesina et al. 2005, 21). 
Type of analysis Information provided by Application 
Fact based analysis Expert informants DB 
Evidence/perception based Firms, management Regulatory Review (RTR) 
Procedural audit, based on time and 
motion study 
Government agencies and 
their clients 
Ex post evaluation of regu-
lations / DB / RTR 
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) Affected stakeholder groups Ex ante evaluation of regu-
lations8 
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Figure 1: The Regulation – Growth connex 
 
 
Investment climate can be differentiated into the following areas: Stability and Security, Reg-
ulation and Taxation, Finance and Infrastructure, and Employment and Labor markets (IEG 
2008, 4). Table 2 further differentiates these areas and highlights the subareas covered by 
DB in the shaded areas. The RTR approach is potentially open to all of the below mentioned 
areas.  
Research on the DB methodology shows that there the fact based and the (few) perception 
based indicators are highly correlated with other measures of investment climate like the 
Global Competitiveness Index (World Development Forum) and the Business Environment 
Rankings (Economist Intelligence Unit). However, there is a weaker correlation of perception-
based indicators with the DB indicators in middle and lower income countries (IEG 2008, 81; 
FN 4; DB11 2010, 13). This is of interest in the Rwandan case.  
On a more disaggregated basis, of the above mentioned DB-related regulatory areas rele-
vant for investment climate, none proved to be significantly correlated with growth, invest-
ment and employment (IEG 2008, 36; Eiffert 2007, 37). As the DB overall rankings are posi-
tively correlated with other investment climate measures, this raises the question to which 
extent the latter provide significant information about actual business activity and the associ-
ated macro variables.  
Some business surveys on the effect of regulation on productivity and investment, however, 
suggest a causal relationship between regulation and investment (CFIB 2010, 9-10). 
All in all, no clear causal relationship between the measures of business environment and 
investment / growth is to be found in the literature.  
… 
Regulation 
… 
… 
Business 
environ-
ment 
… 
… 
Investment 
climate 
… 
… 
Economic 
activity / 
investment 
… 
… 
Growth 
… 
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Table 2: Elements of investment climate10 
 
Stability and  
Security 
Stability 
 
• Reduce political instability from civil wars, 
political conflict, etc. 
• Maintain macro-economic stability with low 
inflation, sustainable budget deficits, and real-
istic exchange rates  
 
Security of property rights 
 
• Reduce robbery, fraud, and other crimes 
against property 
• End uncompensated expropriation of 
property 
• Verify rights to land and other Property  
• Facilitate contract enforcement 
 
Regulation and  
Taxation 
Regulation 
 
• Balance market and government failures for a 
good institutional fit 
• Address regulatory cost and informality 
• Reduce uncertainty and risk in interpretation 
and implementation of existing regulations 
• Reduce regulatory barriers to competition 
Taxation 
 
• Broaden tax base Increase autonomy of 
tax agencies  
• Reduce corruption in tax administration 
• Confront informality 
• Simplify tax structure 
• Improve customs administration 
• Improve compliance through computeri-
zation
 
Finance and  
Infrastructure  
Finance 
 
• Foster competition in the banking sector 
• Control risk-taking by banks and other finan-
cial institutions 
• Secure rights of borrowers, creditors, and 
shareholders 
• Improve credit information by using credit 
bureaus and stronger data protection and 
credit reporting laws
Infrastructure 
 
• Improve climate for investment in infra-
structure by securing investors’ property 
rights,fostering competition, and encour-
aging private participation 
• Improve public management of  
 infrastructure 
 
Employment and 
labor markets  
Labor Market 
 
• Foster a skilled and healthy workforce by 
expanding access to education, improving 
education quality, supporting life-long learning, 
and the like 
• Help workers affected by large scale restruc-
turings by reinforcing social insurance mecha-
nisms and reaching out to the large share of 
workers in rural and informal economies 
 
 
 
_ 
Source: adapted from (IEG 2008, 4) 
2 Methodological underpinnings of SBP and DB 
The approaches to business environment measurement adopted by SBP and DB are part of 
a larger set of methods that are used to assess regulation either ex ante or ex post. In the 
following sections both approaches will be introduced, and their distinguishing features with 
regard to their results will be highlighted. 
                                                
10  Shaded areas indicate types of regulation covered by DB. 
• Craft labor market interventions to benefit 
all (formal and informal) in the process of 
setting wages, regulation of working 
conditions, and hiring and firing of work-
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2.2 The SBP Approach11 
SBP’s RTR is based on the “regulatory review methodology”, which “encompasses the as-
sessment of regulatory costs, and the identification of key administrative blockages and de-
lays that contribute to these cost” (SBP 2008, 14). RTR is based on a survey of businesses, 
and is therefore of a perception based type12. However, as the methodology gathers data on 
the real cost of compliance (cash flow, management time, and other internal resources) with 
existing regulations, it provides factual information, too. Over and above this, the aim of the 
RTR methodology is to provide information to governments on the specific hurdles faced by 
firms, allowing a government to fine tune further reform.  
The RTR design of a survey is country specific. The companies surveyed are selected to 
create a representative sample of the formal business sector, with respect to industry, size, 
and regional distribution13. However, SBP cooperates closely with national business organi-
zations. It is not clear whether membership in these organizations and cooperation with the 
survey team are voluntary, and whether this may result in a bias.  
The areas covered by RTR were not pre-defined by a questionnaire or by SBP. Instead, RTR 
aims to cover a range of relevant regulatory hurdles as wide as possible. As these hurdles – 
and their perceptions - differ from country to country, this approach is not a priori open to 
international comparisons. Rather, an economy specific regulatory landscape is being creat-
ed. In the case of Rwanda, only three significant areas of regulatory burdens emerged from 
the open questions asked: taxation, trade and labor regulations. Thus, the actual coverage of 
RTR may seem to be narrower, and as a matter of fact is narrower in the case of Rwanda, 
than that of DB, but it reflects the relative weight managers put on the different regulatory 
areas, and the relative weight of regulation vis-à-vis other policy areas (e.g. education, infra-
structure, etc). RTR also allows to distinguish between government regulations and other 
hurdles faced by firms, putting into perspective the role of government.14,15  
RTR does not use a standardized business case to define a typical firm. Instead, it allows for 
differentiation by geographical area, firm size, industry and other dimensions. This of course 
puts additional weight on the selection process in order to avoid bias with respect to one of 
the above dimensions.16  
                                                
11  Based on the below described SBP approach, an analysis of the Rwandan business environment 
was performed and published in a report titled “Cutting the Cost of Red Tape” (in short:RTR). As 
the methodology is country specific, all descriptions of the SBP approach will refer to RTR. 
12  Perception based surveys are subjective by nature. Few surveys of business regulation include the 
subjective assessment of business regulation; a comparison of cost measurement methods used 
internationally, compiled by Bertelsmann Stiftung, identified two out of seven methods to include 
subjective assessments (Riedel 2009, 29). 
13  In the Rwandan case, 276 large/medium and 127 small enterprises in all provinces and from all 
sectors of the economy were selected for the sample (SBP 2008, 124). 
14  See (SBP 2008, 21). 
15  In other words, the wide scope suggested by the DB method may overemphasize areas that are 
not actually seen as problematic by actors on the ground. 
16  For the sample design of RTR, see section 3.4.  
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The sequence of questions raised runs from most general to most specific. First, factors 
generally discouraging business growth, employment, investment or any other area of con-
cern are asked and ranked, yielding a distinction between regulatory and non-regulatory fac-
tors (such as competitive situation, business cycle, infrastructure etc. (SBP 2008, 21, 42)). 
This is followed by questions about specific regulatory hurdles which allow distinguishing 
among the government agencies involved in the respective areas of concern. 
In a further step, the cost of regulations identified as major hurdles is assessed. RTR distin-
guishes between compliance cost, administrative cost, efficiency cost, and non-compliance 
cost (RTR 2008, 28). 
 
Table 3: Regulatory cost categories 
Category of regulatory cost Examples of Activities  
involved 
Burden on… 
Compliance Cost Time; fees to service providers Firms; economy   
Efficiency and opportunity cost Reduced business activity or size Economy  
Non-compliance cost Paying fines, bribes  Non-complying firms, economy 
Administrative cost Government agency activities  Economy  
Source: adapted from (SBP 2008, 28) 
 
Of these cost categories, compliance cost is analyzed within the RTR framework. Other cost 
categories, and efficiency cost in particular, can be assessed indirectly by asking about the 
ways businesses try to avoid regulatory cost (e.g. outsourcing or limiting the firms size in 
order not to cross certain thresholds may increase inefficiency cost (SBP 2008, 51)).17  
2.2 The Doing Business Approach 
The World Bank’s Doing Business approach goes back to the year 2004 when the first annu-
al report was published. It attempts to gather information on nine indicators that are sup-
posed to describe regulations governing the typical life cycle of a firm, from starting to closing 
a firm. Annex 1 lists these indicators and the associated sub-indicators18. It should be noted 
that this list reflects the assessment of regulations as performed in the 2011 annual report. 
Prior to that date, an indicator set covering labor relations was included; this, together with 
information on electricity supply, is now presented in an annex to the annual report (from the 
2011 on), but not included in the overall DB rankings.  
Data on the sub-indicators are provided by selected experts in the field, so called informants. 
These, in the case of the DB 11 report, consist of “more than 8,200 local experts, including 
lawyers, business consultants, accountants, freight forwarders, government officials and oth-
er professionals routinely administering or advising on legal and regulatory requirements” 
                                                
17  For the underlying methodology of cost calculation see (SBP 2008, 62). 
18  The set of indicators has been changing over time. Therefore, a comparison of data over time has 
limitations. For a definition of the indicators valid in a particular year, see the respective annual re-
ports of the DB project. The database provided online does include adjusted values for indicators, 
but still does not calculate rankings reaching back more than two years. 
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(DB11 2010, 109). However, as DB counts each completed questionnaire as one informant 
(IEG 2008, 13), the actual number of experts may be considerably smaller. During the 2008 
evaluation exercise the actual average number of questionnaire informants per indicator set 
ranged from 1 to 3.5. In other words, the average number of informants per country, looking 
at all nine indicator sets, was 9.5 persons in 2008. This number included lawyers (70%), 
government officials (18%), accountants (8%), and other experts (4%), but no managers of 
firms conforming with the standard business case (see below)19.  
DB data contain two types of information: first, factual information about existing laws and 
regulations, and second, time and motion information about the cost of obtaining clearances 
from authorities. However, the latter type of data are not recorded at the firm level, but at the 
agent / informant level and they reflect official fee schedules (DB11 2010, 12), not necessari-
ly the actual cost of obtaining clearances.  
Informants are assuming a standard business case when evaluating the relevant regulations. 
These assumptions are listed in Annex 3. 
A special feature of DB is the ranking of countries along their performance with respect to 
individual indicator sets and, on this basis, along an overall “Ease of Dong Business” perfor-
mance. The method raises a number of important issues which deserve attention. However, 
as they are beyond the scope of this paper they will not be dealt with here.  
2.3 Comparison of the two approaches 
Both, the SBP and the DB approach to measuring business environment regulation will be 
compared with regard to the criteria mentioned in section 1.1. 
 Goals: Both the RTR and the DB approach take measure of a country’s business envi-
ronment. Their stated goals are similar: to provide governments with a regulatory profile 
that allows the identification of hurdles and bottlenecks and to initiate reform efforts. 
 Method of gathering information: DB applies a so called “fact based” method, i.e. firms 
agents and officials dealing with regulation as it is written down in laws and decrees is 
evaluated; also, DB relies on a small number of informants (on average less than 10 per 
country). SBP follows a so called perception based method, i.e. it surveys firms directly 
with regard to how regulation – whether decreed or not - affects businesses on the 
ground. The number of firms is large and structured enough to allow a sample repre-
sentative of the country’s economic structure. Also, RTR focuses strongly on the cost of 
regulatory burdens; DB does not allow the calculation of aggregated regulatory cost. DB 
only counts the cost that is based on official fee schedules; the cost of compliance with 
the regulation is only partially covered where time is used as a measure of regulatory 
compliance. However, as noted above, compliance in DB is seen as activities performed 
by agents acting on behalf of firms, not as actions of firm staff themselves. It is not clear, 
whether this, apart from the type of firm definition of the standard business case, creates 
a further bias towards larger firms which can afford to hire these agents. Small firms and 
                                                
19  DB 2009 lists 22 persons for Rwanda, of which two were positively identified as belonging to a (the 
same) business (freight service) (World Bank 2009, 184). 
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those in transition from the informal sector into the formal sector in particular, are less 
likely to hire agents. The effect of regulation on this class of firms therefore is likely not to 
be covered by the DB analysis; this being in contradiction to the original DB goals which 
emphasize the transition of informal businesses into the formal sphere as a major driver 
of (official) employment, growth and investment. Data obtained through either method 
are subject to cleaning and validation processes. These are not fully transparent; they 
tend to allow for biases especially where a high share of questions are open, as is the 
case with the RTR.  
 Types of businesses considered: DB assumes a standard business case for all coun-
tries, whereas SBP surveys a sample of firms typical for the country concerned. DB al-
lows a cross country comparison of results. SBP’s results are country specific. 
 Regional and sectoral scope: DB generally focuses on a country’s capital city, but allows 
for separate studies of other regions or industry clusters within a country; sectors are not 
specified. SBP considers a country’s regions and sectors as they are representative of 
the country’s economic structure.  
 Estimation of regulatory cost: DB lists cost as listed in official fee schedules. SPB esti-
mates the total cost of compliance with regulations at the firm, regional, sectoral, and 
macro level. 
 Ability to measure correctly supply of regulatory reforms by the government (DB) and 
demand for reforms by businesses (SBP): DB measures reforms as they are decreed. 
This should allow for a correct description of a government’s reform efforts when com-
munication with the authorities is working. SBP cannot measure supply of reforms, but 
rather forms a basis for demand of reforms as firms are listing the major hurdles to doing 
business. The adequacy of the demand estimation relies heavily on the quality of data 
generation.  
 Effects on government reform agenda: The approaches differ in their effects: whereas 
the SBP approach – due to its country specific nature - is not easily open to cross coun-
try comparisons, the DB approach is best known for its country rankings. On the other 
hand, the RTR approach allows governments to target regulatory reform in such a way 
as to relieve firms from the most cumbersome and costly regulators burdens. DB is less 
well suited to yield this result, because the measured business environment reflects laws 
as they are written rather than their enforcement and effect on businesses “on the 
ground” (see for this distinction: (La Porta et al 2008, 293)). 
3 Case study Rwanda 
This chapter focuses on the results of both the DB and the SBP approach with regard to 
Rwanda. First, economic reforms as decreed by the Rwandan government will be described. 
This constitutes the supply side of business environment reforms. DB will then be analyzed 
regarding its accuracy of measuring the supply side. The results of the SBP approach of 
2008 are interpreted as a measure of the demand side. Demand and supply of reforms will 
then be compared in order to establish whether the Rwandan government by its policy met 
the demands of the business sector. Finally, the third chapter will compare the results of a 
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survey of business environment conducted in 2010 with the assessment of the business en-
vironment by DB in the same year. This comparison is then used to evaluate whether the 
reforms undertaken in Rwanda between 2008 and 2010 have actually been effective and 
thus have contributed to the overall goal of Good Governance. 
3.1 Economic environment and economic reforms in Rwanda 
First, the major sources of information on the business environment in Rwanda will be 
sketched. This is followed by an overview of reforms in Rwanda since 2007 as stated by the 
Rwandan government.  
Major sources of information about the Rwandan regulatory environment are the Rwanda 
government and the World Bank. The World Bank mostly lists reforms documented in its DB 
Database. Other sources of information on the reform efforts of the Rwandan government 
are scarce and scattered, sometimes only indicative of reforms. The latest WTO Trade Policy 
Review dates from 2004 and therefore does not include the period of reforms. The IMF 
commends Rwanda’s successful macroeconomic adjustment. In June 2010, Rwanda adopt-
ed the IMF’s PSI program (Policy Support Instrument) which is open to countries that do not 
depend on financial assistance from the IMF anymore (Gershenson 2010). IMF International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) at the time of writing do not offer relevant data beyond 2008. 
UNCTAD data show that between 2007 and 2009 Rwanda recorded an annual increase in 
FDI inflows of 20% (UNCTAD 2010, 168); its FDI stock rose fivefold in each of the decades 
1990-2000 and 2000-2010 (UNCTAD 2010, 173).20 
Reforms of the business environment regulation undertaken in Rwanda as stated by the 
government are summarized in table 4b. Over the period 2007 to 2010 a total of 21 reforms 
were implemented. In terms of the DB indicator categories, the largest number of them fo-
cused on taxes, trade, and property registration. Most of the reforms occurred in the year 
2009/2010.  
3.2 Registration and timing of reforms by the World Bank Doing Business 
Database 
In this section, the sequence of business environment changes as identified by DB will be 
compared with those reported by the Rwandan government in order to evaluate the accuracy 
of reform measurement by DB.  
Figures 2-9 illustrate the timing of regulatory reforms in Rwanda. The graphs are based on 
data reported in the DB annual reports.21 They show the development of DB sub-indicators of 
business regulation by means of index values. The base of these values is 1 for the year the 
                                                
20  It is interesting to note that although within an international country ranking of FDI inflows Rwanda 
jumped from rank 105 to rank 65 in only two years, the FDI inward potential index for Rwanda 
barely changed between 2007 and 2008 (UNCTAD, 2010, 22). It would be interesting to see 
whether economic reforms after 2008 will have an impact on this outcome-oriented indicator. 
21  The years in Figures 1-9 are years of DB annual reports, not years of reforms. 
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sub indicator was first observed by DB. It becomes clear that most of the economic reforms 
in Rwanda recorded by DB occurred in 2008 or in the following years. These data confirm 
the description of reforms by the government and international organizations (the sources 
presented in section 3.1). It is confirmed, too, by tables 4a and 4b which list reform activities 
as reported indirectly by DB and directly by the Rwandan government.  
 
Figures 2 to 9: Timing of reforms in Rwanda 
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Tables 4a and 4b list the areas of economic reform between 2008 and 2010, based on the 
Doing Business annual reports 2009 – 2011, and on reports of the Ministry of Trade and In-
dustry, for comparison. According to DB reports, the largest number of reforms (7) occurred 
in the year 2008/2009, most of the reform activities over the period (3) focused on the finan-
cial sector, and here on the credit availability to firms. This table differs considerably from 
official information provided by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Government of Rwanda 
(see Table 7 and Annex 2). There, for 2008/2009 six areas of reform including seven 
measures are listed, and for 2009/2010 seven areas of reform including 14 measures are 
listed. The differences in the number of affected areas may be explained by different defini-
tions of dates when regulations become effective. Still, the fact that DB includes government 
officials among its informers should warrant a single timeline of reforms.  
As a supporting illustration only, Table 5 may be used. It shows Rwanda’s international rank-
ings with respect to the nine DB indicator sets. However, due to the relative nature of rank-
ings, they do not necessarily show factual improvements. Still, as a worsened regulatory en-
vironment has seldom been identified in the DB annual reports, a general and global trend 
towards improvement may be assumed. In this case, positive changes in rankings point to 
improvements in the business environment that exceed those of other countries in the same 
quantile. For Rwanda, positive changes in rankings clearly outnumbered negative ones by 6 
to 3 and 6 to 2 in the DB reports of 2010 and 2011, covering the years 2008/09 and 2009/10. 
In the years before, the positive and negative changes were more or less balanced. This may 
be taken as an indication of stronger reform activity in the later years.  
The various comparisons of data published by the Rwandan government and by DB point to 
a correct description of both timing and sectoral distribution of business environment reforms 
by DB.  
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Table 4a: Reforms in Rwanda 2008-2010 according to DB annual reports  
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2007/2008 X X X X  4
2008/2009 X X X X X X X 7
2009/2010 X X X  3
Sector total 1 2 1 3 1 1 2 2 1 14
Source: based on annual DB reports 
 
Table 4b: Reforms in Rwanda 2008-2010 according to Government reports 
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2007/2008   
2008/2009 2 1 1 1 1 1 7
2009/2010 1 2 3 1 3 4 1 14
Sector total 3 3 4 2 1 4 4 0 1 21
Source: based on Table 7 
 
3.3 Assessment of the regulatory environment in Rwanda in 2008 by DB 
In this section a qualitative assessment of the Rwandan business environment as measured 
by the DB indicator is attempted. In a later section this will then be compared with the as-
sessment by SBP. 
DB does not directly provide information on strengths and weaknesses of a country’s regula-
tory environment. This can only be concluded from a country’s relative position in the interna-
tional ranking. However, an international ranking does not necessarily reflect the valuation of 
the regulatory environment from a domestic business’ perspective; rather, these rankings are 
indicative of an outsider’s perception of Rwanda. This view is taken seriously by the Rwan-
dan government as it cites the international rankings of Rwanda in frequently in its docu-
ments (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2009, 24; Ministry of Trade and Industry 2010, 20). 
Table 5 shows the rankings for Rwanda as published in the respective annual reports. They 
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can be considered to reflect the international perception of the strengths and weaknesses of 
Rwanda’s regulatory environment.  
For both DB 2007 and DB 2008 regulation of the financial sector (both investor protection 
and credit markets) and of foreign trade appear to be relatively unfavorable. Table 4a 
showed that these areas were attracting above average reform activities during the years 
2008 and 2009. On the other hand, enforcing contracts and starting a business were also 
reformed in two years, despite the fact that rankings in these areas were relatively benign 
from the beginning. Therefore, it cannot be concluded from the data that the government 
targeted reforms to those areas that were attracting negative international attention; neither 
does it prove that these badly ranked areas were in fact areas of major concern to the gov-
ernment, or businesses in Rwanda22. However, the government’s accelerated reform activi-
ties coincided with a drop in the total ranking in DB 2007 from 139 to 158. In other words, the 
DB data do not provide a conclusive indication of relative strengths or weaknesses of indi-
vidual regulatory areas in Rwanda as perceived by the local businesses.  
 
Table 5: Rwanda’s rank with regard to DB indicator sets 
Starting a 
Business
Dealing with 
Construction 
Permits
Registering 
Property
Getting 
Credit
Protecting 
Investors
Paying Taxes
Trading 
Across 
Borders
Enforcing 
Contracts
Closing a 
Business
Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank
DB2004 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
DB2005 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
DB2006 139 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ..
DB2007 158 58 133 134 159 162 83 175 69 151
DB2008 150 63 124 137 158 165 50 166 44 178
DB2009 139 60 90 60 145 170 56 168 48 181
DB2010 67 11 89 38 61 27 60 170 40 183
DB2011 58 9 82 41 32 28 43 159 39 183
Year
Ease of Doing 
Business 
Rank
 
 
3.4 Assessment of the regulatory environment in Rwanda in 2008 by RTR 
In this section, the qualitative assessment as measured by the RTR will be described. The 
results of this assessment can be considered to build the demand side for reforms. This de-
mand will then be compared with the reforms actually undertaken, thus allowing an evalua-
tion of the adequacy of business environment reforms in Rwanda.  
The evaluation of the Rwandan business environment by RTR was done in 2008. The survey 
included 403 companies, of which two thirds are large and medium firms (the firms surveyed 
constitute 10% of all large and medium firms in Rwanda.). Of the firms surveyed, 236 were 
based in the capital, Kigali, the remainder being based in equal shares in the Western, 
Northern, Southern and Eastern provinces. All sectors of the economy were covered.   
                                                
22  Still, the government points out: “The reforms were led by the Investment Climate Department in 
MINICOM and the Doing Business Unit at RDB, co-ordinated by the national Doing Business Task-
force. This team has ensured the carrying through of a number of reforms that have led to the indi-
cator improvements in the Doing Business Report” (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2009, 24). 
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Table 6 illustrates the results of the SBP analysis. It lists barriers to business growth in order 
of importance23 as stated by the respondents. These barriers are then structured in such a 
way that they can be assigned to the regulatory categories applied by DB.  
Apart from the most pressing concern about “lack of demand”24, the most important regulato-
ry barrier (here listed as No 1) concerns obtaining financial funds, which can be related to 
two DB indicator areas (access to credit, investor protection). The third most important barri-
er concerns taxation, both the level of taxes and the effort of complying with tax laws. The 
barriers mentioned less frequently are either not of a regulatory nature (“high costs”) or are 
too general (“regulation”) or were mentioned by only a small number of respondents. Regula-
tion, according to RTR, is an issue for at least 25% of respondents.  
Taxation, labor regulation and skills emerged as the most important item when respondents 
were asked to name regulatory issues, constraints on employment, interaction with the gov-
ernment, and “time consuming and troublesome” regulations in more detail (SBP2008, 42). 
In the latter category, business registration and closure were mentioned. 
For Rwanda, the order of importance to businesses of these areas proves to be valid across 
business sectors, firm size and geographical area. Not surprisingly, two of the areas of con-
cern (taxation, Import/Export regimes) were mentioned as priority areas for regulatory re-
form:25  
Table 7 disaggregates the concerns of businesses. They are listed from a more general (lev-
el 1) to a very specific level (3). These specific concerns are then compared with reform ac-
tivities of the Rwandan government since 2008. Thus, they can be interpreted as demand for 
and supply of reforms in Rwanda.  
Summarizing demand for and supply of reforms as defined above, reforms were covering all 
but one indicator set of the DB database. With respect to the 20 more specific concerns of 
businesses as described by the RTR report, 7 were covered by reforms, and 13 areas were 
not covered. Did the reforms address the needs of RTR respondents, i.e. of Rwandan busi-
nesses? They did with respect to availability of capital, they were partly consistent with RTR 
revealed need in registration/closure of businesses, and were more or less beside the point 
(reforming where RTR did not detect demand) in three areas. This points to a bias of reform 
design towards the DB indicators.  
 
                                                
23  It should be noted that the listed barriers are the result of answers to open questions. For detailed 
results, see (SBP 2008, 21). 
24  The most important barrier was considered to be lack of demand which is interpreted by the SBP 
authors as an indication of marketing weaknesses of many firms; it therefore is not a regulatory is-
sue and the analysis does not apply. 
25  It would be interesting to see whether this order of importance appears in other countries, too. SBP 
has not published any other comparable studies, though.  Alternatively, a cross country analysis of 
the World Bank’s enterprise survey data (which are also perception based) could be attempted.  
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Table 6: Areas and adequacy of Rwandan regulatory reform 
Area of reform Demand 
mostly 
met?  
Detailed description  
1. Access to 
capital 
Yes The most important area of concern, lack of capital, was tackled by 
two reforms in 2008/09 and one further reform in the following year. 
These reforms provide for regulations that deal with the most 
pressing needs of borrowers and lenders, i.e. pledging mobile col-
lateral and establishment of a credit registry. The latter is confirmed 
by data in Figure 5. 
2. Taxation 
Partly The second most important area of concern, taxation, was covered 
by one reform in 2008/09 and another three measures in 2009/10. 
The reforms make the process of declaring tax easier, but they fail 
to deal with the issue of communication with RRA, which can be 
rooted to lack of skills and inefficient organizational structures with-
in RRA. Also, the decision on and level of penalties were not tack-
led.  
3. Registration/ 
closure of 
business 
Supply > 
demand 
Registration and closure of businesses constitutes another area of 
concern. Neither of these areas was specified by respondents; 
nonetheless, the first was the subject of reforms: opening a busi-
ness has been made easier through two reforms in each year, 
business closure issues were not dealt with.  
4. Labor 
No The area of labor regulations was not specified as a high ranking 
area of concern by respondents. However, the RTR spelled out the 
weaknesses under the heading “regulation” in detail. Still, no re-
forms were undertaken in the two years, with the exception of 
online income and value added tax payments. The liberalization of 
work permits for foreigners preceded that time.  
5. Trade 
Partly Weaknesses in the area of foreign trade regulation, presumed to be 
included in concerns about regulation in general, was described in 
more detail in the RTR, too. Here, of five weaknesses listed in 
RTR, two were covered by reforms in the second year. They mostly 
dealt with speedier processing of documents, whereas complaints 
about ineffective and insufficiently skilled staff where not covered.  
6. Other  
Supply > 
demand 
Areas not mentioned by businesses in the RTR like registration of 
property issuing of construction permits where covered by one re-
form each in 2008/09 and two reforms each in 2009/10. Incidental-
ly, those areas (like opening and closing a business, see above), 
feature prominently on the Doing Business list of indicators.  
 
The demand/supply approach to reforms may provide a political economy type of explana-
tion. A different tack would be taken if the government is assumed to behave as a benevolent 
dictator. In this case its goal would be to reduce the cost of regulation26.  
The RTR offers insights into the cost of regulation to businesses (SBP 2008, ch.7). A hy-
pothesis for how the government prioritizes reforms is to assume that most costly regulations 
would be tackled either first or most intensively.  
 
                                                
26  Gross cost, as regulation benefits are not addressed. 
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Figure 10: Regulatory Cost in Rwanda, 2008 
 
 
Figure 10 provides an overview of regulatory reform for five firm size groups, measured by 
the number of employees (<5,5-49, 50-99, 100+)27. Clearly, taxation and inbound trade con-
stitute the activities that suffer from the most expensive regulations. In fact, both areas are 
covered by the reforms. The government based reform count (see Table 4b) reflects the cost 
determined priorities more strongly than the reform count by DB. This might be due to both 
the high political visibility that the RTR’s cost calculations activities had. Also the Public Pri-
vate Dialogue mechanism28 underlying the Economic cooperation program of which RTR is a 
part may have contributed to this effect.  
It cannot be excluded that the use of cost estimates has a stronger effect on the govern-
ment’s reform efforts than non-monetized indicators (i.e. the pure responses to either the fact 
based or perception based questionnaires). This makes the cost based approach a potential-
ly powerful tool for reform design.  
 
                                                
27  The seemingly lower cost for larger firms is due to the small number of large firms; e.g. the sample 
underlying RTR contained up to 21000 small firms, and up to 112 large firms. 
28  This was confirmed by Emmanuel Hategeka, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
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Table 7: Demand for and supply of regulatory reform in Rwanda, 2008-2010 
Level 1: general 
business barri-
ers 
% of 
res-
pon-
dents 
Level 2: regu-
lation (DB 
areas) 
Level 3: specific regulatory barrier Reforms 2008/2009 Reforms 2009/2010 
Lack of demand   >35 n.a.    
Lack of capital 
>35 Getting credit Difficulty in establishing collateral Mobile collateral possible Credit registry 
 Protecting 
investors 
 Bankruptcy law  
Tax 
>25 Tax compli-
ance 
Waiting time at tax offices  Quarterly payments for SME 
Travel time to tax office Additional bank licensed for tax 
payments 
Online tax registration; 
Decentralized tax services 
Penalties for late payment, even if 
caused by RRA 
  
Multiple points of contact   
Communication from RRA   
Verification process  Online tax calculators for PAYE, 
VAT 
Audits   
 Tax level    
Competition >10 n.a.    
Regulations 
>5 Business reg-
istration 
 Registration streamlined from 
14 days to 24h 
 
Registration fee reduced  Online business registration 
Business 
closure 
  Registration fees can be paid at 
any Bank of Kigali branch 
Import 
regulations 
See below foreign trade   
Employing 
workers 
Lack of information and/or poor un-
derstanding of labor regulations 
  
Administrative issues, skills  of staff   
Difficulties accessing work permits 
for foreign workers 
  
Dismissal of employees, high com-
pensation cost 
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Time consuming NSSF compliance   
Employee insurance, cost   
PAYE, time consuming  Online tax calculators for PAYE, 
VAT 
Contracts, inflexible   
High costs 
>5 Lack of skills  See labor regulation, hiring of foreign 
workers 
  
Foreign Trade Time costs of in-person interaction 
with authorities 
  
Delays at customs  24h-operations at some border 
crossings;  
Harmonization of procedures with 
EAC;  
Single window put in place; 
Asycuda++ in place 
Duties and taxes (level)   
Exemptions, low skills of customs 
staff  
  
Bureau of standards, long delays  Streamlined trade documents 
Other: environmental regulations 
(ban on plastic wrappings), delays 
with other government agencies in-
volved  
  
Admin procedures >1 n.a.    
Corruption/fraud >1 n.a.    
Infrastructure >1 n.a.    
Public meetings >1 n.a.    
Other not men-
tioned  by RTR 
respondents 
 Registration of 
property 
 Property registration checklist Land sale contracts not required 
 Speedier verification of property 
ownership 
Speedier checking of files 
  Construction 
permits 
 Launch of Kigali client charter One stop procedure in Kigali 
Time limit on application processing 
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3.5 Results of the sample survey in 201029 
In this section, the assessment of regulatory reform in Rwanda since 2008 is contrasted with 
the results obtained during a survey mission in November 2010. Following the method ap-
plied in section 3.4, the survey asked respondents about regulatory hurdles in the areas de-
fined by the DB indicators. The goal is to find out whether the reforms decreed by the gov-
ernment and measured by DB were effective “on the ground”, i.e. whether businesses actual-
ly felt a clear improvement in these areas. Hence, the 2010 survey combined elements of the 
SBP approach (perception based survey) with elements of DB (pre-defined criteria) and thus 
allows an evaluation of the DB results.  
In November 2010, managers from 12 private sector businesses, two banks, two government 
agencies, two universities and one business association were interviewed. Of the business-
es, five belong to the service sector, one to the agricultural sector, and six to the manufactur-
ing sector. Turnover ranged from FRW 35m to FRW 5500, fixed employment ranged from 15 
to 700 persons, and nine firms directly or indirectly30 were involved in cross border transac-
tions. Businesses were located in the urban area of the capital, Kigali (9), in the provincial 
center area of Butare (2), and one in rural areas. All the firms had been subject to the SBP 
exercise in 2008. 
The goal of the interviews was to evaluate the effects of latest regulatory reforms “on the 
ground”, i.e. whether these reforms have effectively solved businesses’ problems that were 
either mentioned by the SBP report31 or that showed a below-average ranking in the DB indi-
cators.   
The interviews were of a semi-open question type; the managers were asked to describe the 
situation regarding the nine DB indicator sets, plus the issue of labor legislation (“Employing 
workers” in earlier DB rankings). The (open) answers were then coded regarding their de-
gree of meeting the goals of the regulatory reform listed by DB, ranging from +1 (100% effec-
tiveness of reform) to -1 (no effectiveness at all).  
In table 8 below, the responses for the results for the indicators are listed in their order of 
evaluation, with a high positive mean indicating that the regulatory burdens in the concerned 
DB indicator group were felt on the ground; conversely, a high negative mean would indicate 
that no relief from regulatory burdens was felt in the indicator group.  
Reforms with regard to indicators starting a business and registering property were perceived 
as being most successful, whereas getting credit and closing a business were seen as the 
least successful areas of regulatory reform.  
                                                
29  The field survey was commissioned by GTZ, Rwanda.  
30  Indirectly is defined as using imported materials or products and having to comply with regulations 
concerning usage of foreign goods or their maintenance. 
31  All firms were involved in the survey underlying the RTR of 2008. 
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Table 8: Perception of regulatory reforms by business managers 
DB Indicator Mean  Description 
Starting a 
business 
+0,8 Most managers evaluated the process of opening a business very 
positively. However, two of them also reported that the situation was 
as easy before 2008. Most of them reported that apart from the regis-
tration process, other difficulties which were not tackled by reforms 
remain 
Registering 
Property 
+0.3 Experiences of managers diverged strongly. In some cases, recent 
registration took 21 months, in other cases it was considered to be 
very easy. One stop agencies were established at locations outside 
Kigali, too, but still the required documents to get a title have to be 
obtained from lower level agencies which have not been reformed and 
which contribute to the cumbersome nature of procedures. 
Employing 
Workers 
0 The existing laws were seen as less problematic than the lack of skills. 
In this respect, the laws governing employment of foreigners were 
seen as restrictive; this pertains to related areas, like payments to 
NSSF for expats, too. Another complaint referred to high and unpre-
dictable compensation payments once employees have to be laid off. 
Generally, the hiring of workers was not seen as a problem if lawyers 
are setting up the contracts. 
Enforcing 
contracts 
-0.2 Managers know about the reforms (establishment of business case 
courts), but still do not see the legal system as a viable option to en-
force contracts.  The reasons given are long time for decisions, de-
pendent courts and corruption, as well as a large share of cash based 
transactions that are not reported to the authorities, and hence not 
enforceable. 
Construction 
permits 
-0.3 Mean Respondents stressed that severe regulatory hurdles exist at 
lower levels of decision-making. Fast track construction permissions 
require the submission of documents that have to be issued at district 
or local levels, where long delays still are common. Also, complaints 
about unskilled officials and the necessity to obtain permissions for 
minor changes of existing buildings were mentioned. Furthermore, 
heavy handed regulation in other related areas (e.g. the Kigali master-
plan for inner city development requires owners of property to increase 
covered area by 400%) make construction per se more difficult. 
Paying taxes 
-0.3 Most managers complained that online payments were not possible; 
online registration was appreciated, though. A major problem appears 
to be tax audits, due to unskilled staff and harsh payment conditions. 
Also, the skills of tax officials regarding tax assessment were often 
questioned. VAT payments were seen as a strain on cash flow, as 
payments have to be made when the bill is issued, not when payment 
is received. This pushes many firms into cash payments, which in turn 
reduces efficiency of the financial system as a whole and reduces the 
transparency for the tax authorities. In fact, respondents, when asked 
about the opportunities to enforce contracts (see below),  mentioned 
that courts are not a viable option because many transactions were 
cash based and not reported to the tax authorities. 
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Trading 
across bor-
ders 
-0.4 Generally, processes were sped up, but lacking skills of customs offi-
cials lead to disputes over customs valuation in many cases. These 
problems lead to a delay outside the activities covered by the reforms. 
Closing a 
business 
-0.5 Generally the law is seen as good, but ineffective because bankruptcy 
is not an option for other reasons: most managers responded that a 
defaulter would be denied access to credit in the future, and that 
claims could not be effectively recovered through the courts. There-
fore, the reform seems not have been effective yet 
Getting credit 
-0.5 Most managers complained about the inability to secure loans with 
mobile (working) capital. One respondent mentioned a credit window 
against mobile collateral at a Kenyan bank. Here clearly the reforms 
have not been effective on the ground; based on interviews with bank 
managers, this seems to be due to the banks which are particularly 
risk averse at the time of the financial crisis and therefore do not adopt 
the latest changes in regulation 
Protecting 
investors 
n.a. No statements were made regarding this indicator. 
 
Summing up, very diverse responses of managers do not convey a clear picture of the regu-
latory situation at the end of 2010. The average of all responses was slightly negative (-0.03), 
e.g. respondents in November 2010 did not perceive the reforms undertaken since 2008 to 
clearly have improved the business environment as measured and defined by the DB indica-
tor sets. The small sample size does not provide statistically significant results of the inter-
views. However, the responses of the generally well informed business managers are indica-
tive of the (post-2008) reform regulatory situation in Rwanda.  
The below graph illustrates the perception of reforms by the business managers interviewed 
in November 2010. In two areas (starting a business, registering property) respondents on 
average saw improvements of the regulatory environment, although in no area was there 
unanimous agreement on the improvements. In the six remaining areas respondents per-
ceived the situation as not reflecting reform efforts; the least progress was made with respect 
to capital availability, trade and closing a business.32  
 
 
 
                                                
32  Investor protection was not commented by respondents. 
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Figure 11: Summary perceptions of reform effects 
 
 
These results compare with the reform measures listed in table 7 (level1). There, cumber-
some trade regulation was mentioned as a severe problem, a view confirmed by the inter-
views of 2010. However, reforms addressed only a few of the specific regulatory problems 
(processing time), but did not tackle the issue of skills in the RRA. Regulation of credit mar-
kets did not address the problems sufficiently either, as the reforms were not taking into con-
sideration the reluctance of banks to make use of the new regulation. Perception of the tax 
regime has only partly been perceived as improved, because valuation issues (in tax as-
sessment and in audits) and cash flow issues were not addressed by the reforms. However, 
the time savings allowed by the new regulations was appreciated by most businesses.33 Fi-
nally, respondents on average were neutral towards labor regulations, although these were 
listed specifically in the SBP report.  
The general conclusion that reforms did not target the most pressing needs of businesses is 
supported when the results of the 2010 survey are compared with the timeline and strength 
of reforms as measured by DB and illustrated in graphs 2 to 9. Only in the indicator groups 
“starting a business” and “registering property” did respondents in 2010 confirm that the 
strong reforms suggested by DB actually had had an effect “on the ground”, i.e. were felt by 
business managers. For four indicator groups that showed strong improvement in DB (en-
forcing contracts, trade, paying taxes, getting credit) business managers did on average not 
report an improvement of their situation. This, too, points to a low reliability of DB indicators 
to describe the actual regulatory situation of local businesses in Rwanda. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The reforms undertaken by the Rwandan government addressed areas of concern of Rwan-
dan businesses. However, they did not fully reflect the priorities set by respondents of the 
                                                
33  Interestingly, construction permits, enforcement of contracts and procedures for closing a business, 
areas not highlighted in 2008, were now identified as areas of concern. 
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RTR and they did not always prove to be effective on the ground even in areas that were of 
major concern to local businesses.  
Generally, the reforms seem to be geared toward covering areas that are listed in the DB 
indicator sets. Other criteria for an effective and efficient regulatory environment, like those 
mentioned by respondents of the RTR in 2008, seem to have been of lower priority to the 
government.  
In can therefore be concluded, that the (perception based) method underlying the RTR more 
clearly spells out the problems businesses have with existing regulation than the (fact based) 
method of DB does. This is particularly true when a cost based assessment of the regulator 
environment is considered. Whether and how a regulatory analysis that spells out the cost of 
misregulation affects government decision making is not subject of this analysis. Therefore a 
generalization of this result should not be made.  
DB seems to overstate the actual improvement in the regulation of local businesses.  This 
result is confined to the situation in Rwanda. Therefore, a cross country analysis of DB re-
sults may produce a broader based conclusion regarding the suitability of DB for measuring 
a country’s business environment.  
4 Summary conclusion 
1. Existing research shows that the link between business environment and economic 
growth is not yet fully clear.  
2. The methods of business environment assessment differ. The most prominent method is 
fact based and applied by the World Bank’s Doing business project. An alternative is the 
evidence/perception based approach used in Rwanda in the broader context of a devel-
opment cooperation project.  
3. For Rwanda, perception based (SBP) and fact based (DB) approaches do not yield the 
same results regarding the demand for regulatory reform. 
4. The supply of reforms appears to be geared to the reform deficiencies as defined by DB. 
However, when regulatory cost is considered, the perception based approach also 
seems to be in line with the reform activities of the Rwandan government.  
5. The effectiveness of reforms undertaken in Rwanda varies. Based on interviews in late 
2010, of the eight areas defined by the DB indicators, reforms on average were rather 
not effective in five areas, rather effective in two areas, and neutral in one. This rather 
neutral perception of the Rwandan business environment quality after two years of in-
tensive reforms contrasts with the strong improvement of Rwanda in the DB international 
country rankings (from rank 150 in the DB 2008 report to rank 58 in the DB 2011 report). 
Due to the small sample size of the 2010 survey, the results of this survey have to be in-
terpreted with great care, though.  
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There is need for further research on the subject of assessment and effectiveness of regula-
tory reform. Problems arising from rankings (the density per quantile determines changes in 
rankings), effects of perception based vis-à-vis fact based assessment methods on a broader 
base, and the political economy framework of a country as determinant of reform orientation 
deserve more empirical research. Last not least, the effect of business environment on 
growth is not yet established and requires further attention. This issue, when discussed to-
gether with political economy criteria, may yield interesting results regarding what “good gov-
ernance” constitutes in general and the mechanics of regulatory reform in particular. 
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Annex 1: DB indicator sets 
 
Indicator Subindicator 
Starting a  
Business 
Procedures (number) 
Time (days) 
Cost (% of income per capita) 
Min. capital (% of income per capita) 
Dealing with Con-
struction Permits 
Procedures (number) 
Time (days) 
Cost (% of income per capita) 
Registering  
Property 
Procedures (number) 
Time (days) 
Cost (% of property value) 
Getting Credit 
Strength of legal rights index (0-10) 
Depth of credit information index (0-6) 
Public registry coverage (% of adults) 
Private bureau coverage (% of adults) 
Protecting Inves-
tors 
Extent of disclosure index (0-10) 
Extent of director liability index (0-10) 
Ease of shareholder suits index (0-10) 
Strength of investor protection index (0-10) 
Paying Taxes 
Payments (number per year) 
Time (hours per year) 
Profit tax (%) 
Labor tax and contributions (%) 
Other taxes (%) 
Total tax rate (% profit) 
Trading Across 
Borders 
Documents to export (number) 
Time to export (days) 
Cost to export (US$ per container) 
Documents to import (number) 
Time to import (days) 
Cost to import (US$ per container) 
Enforcing  
Contracts 
Procedures (number) 
Time (days) 
Cost (% of claim) 
Closing a Busi-
ness 
Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 
Time (years) 
Cost (% of estate) 
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Annex 2: Reforms undertaken 2008-2010 
 
Indicator 2008/2009 2009/2010 
Starting a 
Business 
Company registration streamlined from 
9 procedures in 14 days (World Bank 
standardestimate) to 2 procedures in 24 
hours, all to be done at the One Stop 
Centre. 
Online business registration is now opera-
tional. This means that a company may be 
incorporated remotely or abroad without 
necessarily coming to RDB. For details, 
visit www.rdb.rw  
Company registration costs reduced 
from the Rwf 12, 000 - Frw100, 000 
ranges to flat fee of Rwf 25,000 irre-
spective of type and number of activi-
ties. 
Payment of registration fees may be done 
in cash or with a Bank of Kigali point of 
sale (POS) that accepts international 
cards.  
Dealing with 
Construction 
Permits 
The launch of Kigali MVK client charter 
outlining the procedures of acquiring 
construction permits: the issuing agen-
cies and the time limits within which a 
business/individual should have all the 
construction paper work done. In addi-
tion an Electrogaz delegate was placed 
at the one stop centre to facilitate con-
nections to utilities for investors 
A Prime Ministerial order legalizing/ en-
forcing time limits for the delivery of con-
struction permits according to the client 
charter and instituting sanctions for failure 
to deliver has been gazette and is being 
enforced. An appeal mechanism for appli-
cants has also been established. Average 
time has reduced from 210 days to less 
than 30 days to obtain a construction per-
mit.  
 A one stop construction permit centre has 
been established and housed in the 
Nyarugenge district offices to ease con-
struction and ensure the time prescribed 
by the client charter is respected. The 
results already speak for themselves. For 
details please visit: 
www.kigalicityconstructionosc.gov.rw. 
 Procedures have been reduced with a 
merger of all inspections done into one 
procedure (inspections of land, electricity 
and water). A public notice has been is-
sued by the Mayor of Kigali city and pub-
lished in the official gazette.  
Registering 
Property 
Improvements in the process of property 
registration with the introduction of a 
checklist list of all documentary re-
quirements by RRA together with land 
registry when carrying out property 
transfers. 
The National Land Centre has abolished 
the requirement to formulate a sale con-
tract cutting back on time to formalize title 
deeds.  
 Reduction in time to verify property owner-
ship to less than 10 days instead of 60  
 Streamlining of file checking with introduc-
tion of checklists  
Getting 
Credit 
The Secured Transaction law will make 
it easier for businesses to obtain credit 
by allowing them to use almost any type 
of movable asset as collateral in loan 
transactions 
Improvements to the public credit registry 
have been implemented widening the data 
to cover 2 years of credit information and 
incorporate information on utilities.  
 A private bureau has gone online by CRB 
Africa widening its scope to cover banking, 
insurance, and utilities’ (electricity, water 
and telecommunications) operations.  
 
 
Protecting 
The new Insolvency Law will for the first 
time establish a legal regime for bank-
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Investors ruptcy and creditor protection in the 
country 
 
 
Paying  
Taxes 
Simplification of paying taxes: indicator 
with the spreading out of tax payment 
points to one more additional bank and 
launching the online facility for applying 
for the tax clearance certificate 
RRA has established online tax calculators 
for PAYE, VAT and profit taxes to help 
especially SMEs to compute their taxes 
thus reducing the time to file a tax declara-
tion.  
 Quarterly filing of VAT and PAYE has 
been enabled facilitating SMEs with an 
annual turnover of RWF 0-200 million. The 
VAT law amendment has been passed 
and gazetted. This covers more than 90% 
of all tax payers in the country.  
 An online tax registration system that ena-
bles tax payers to register rather than 
physically going to RRA offices has been 
established.  
 RRA has decentralized tax services to get 
closer to tax payers.  
Trading 
Across Bor-
ders 
 24 hour border operations have com-
menced at Gatuna (Uganda-Rwanda) 
border and La Corniche (Rwanda DRC).  
 Trade documents have been streamlined 
with the removal of the cargo release order 
and replacing it with a stamp.  
 Customs procedures have been harmo-
nized with the EAC region while non-tariff 
barriers such as issuance of simplified 
certificates of origin and allowing final 
clearance of goods at the border posts 
have been addressed.  
 A semi-automated single window at Cus-
toms has been put in place (already done 
at SDV) and to be implemented at Gikon-
do, Airport, Gatsata and Kabuye oil depots 
this year. A fully automated system includ-
ing outer stations and all border posts is 
slated for May 2011.  
 Asycuda ++ (Automated system for Cus-
toms Data) has been installed and is oper-
ational now to all main borders of the 
country and was extended to NEMBA 
boarder and the Post office  
Enforcing 
Contracts 
  
Closing a 
Business 
 Commercial courts have registered a 
number of insolvency cases (6 decided 
and 9 in the pipeline) indicating that the 
practice is growing in Rwanda.  
Source: (Ministry of Trade and Industry 2009, 25; Ministry of Trade and Industry 2010, 20) 
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Annex 3: DB assumptions for the standardized business case 
 
The business… 
 Is a limited liability company. If there is more than one type of limited liability company in 
the economy, the limited liability form most popular among domestic firms is chosen. In-
formation on the most popular form is obtained from incorporation lawyers or the statisti-
cal office. 
 Operates in the economy’s largest business city. It is 100% domestically owned and has 
5 owners, none of whom is a legal entity. 
 Has start-up capital of 10 times income per capita at the end of 2009, paid in cash. 
 Performs general industrial or commercial activities, such as the production or sale to the 
public of products or services. The business does not perform foreign trade activities and 
does not handle products subject to a special tax regime, for example, liquor or tobacco. 
It is not using heavily polluting production processes. 
 Leases the commercial plant and offices and is not a proprietor of real estate. 
 Does not qualify for investment incentives or any special benefits. 
 Has at least 10 and up to 50 employees 1 month after the commencement of operations, 
all of them nationals. 
 Has a turnover of at least 100 times income per capita. 
 Has a company deed 10 pages long. 
 
Source: (World Bank 2010, 113-114) 
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